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I. INTRODUCTION
Old is good, at least for some things-wine, cheese (within limits),
rare coins, and western water rights. In the West, where the doctrine
of prior appropriation governs the allocation of water, water rights age
well. A water right holder with a senior allocation date is entitled to
cut off use by junior water right holders in times of shortage.' Since
the arid western states experience water shortages not only during
severe cyclical droughts, but often on an annual basis, a senior water
right with an early priority date is among the most valuable of western
property rights.2
In order to protect their valuable priorities, senior water users do
have certain responsibilities, however. A central tenet of the prior
appropriation system is "use it or lose it."3 Since water is scarce and
subject to many competing demands, water users are expected to make
continuous productive use of their water or risk losing it.
All of the seventeen western states have codified their water laws in
statute.' Nearly all of the states implement the "use it or lose it"
requirement in a statutory forfeiture provision.5 Under pre-code water
law, one could only lose a vested water right by common law
abandonment, which required finding both relinquishment of the
water and intent to give it up.6 In contrast, the water codes
incorporated strict statutory forfeiture provisions under which non-use
of the water for some specified-and usually short-period of time
would result in the loss of the water right, without regard to intent.7
The water codes intended statutory forfeiture to be quick, clean, and
predictable.
Ironically, some water rights holders have questioned whether precode rights, the very rights that water codes were designed to clarify,
1. See, e.g., Robert E. Beck, Prevalence and Definition, in 2 WATERS AND WATER
RIGHTS § 12.03(e) (Robert E. Beck ed., 1991 ed. Supp. 1999).
2. ROBERT G. DUNBAR, FORGING NEW RIGHTS IN WESTERN WATERS 209 (1983); B.
Delworth Gardner, Water Pricing and Rent Seeking in California Agriculture, in WATER
RIGHTS: SCARCE RESOURCE ALLOCATION, BUREAUCRACY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 83, 84
(Terry L. Anderson ed., 1983).
3. See generally C. Peter Goplerud III, Protectionand Termination of the Water Right, in
2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 1, § 17.03; Charles B. Roe, Jr. & William J.
Brooks, Loss of Water Rights - Old Ways and New, 35 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. § 23.01, at
23-3 (1989); Janet C. Neuman, Beneficial Use, Waste, and Fofeiture: The Inefficient Search
for Efficiency in Western Water Use, 28 ENvrT. L. 919, 919 (1998).
4. See generally C. Peter Goplerud III, The PermitProcess and Colorado'sException, in 2
WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 1, § 14.01; infra note 33.
5. A. DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES § 5:88 (2000); see
Goplerud, supra note 3, § 17.03(b).
6. TARLOCK, supra note 5, § 5:87; see Goplerud, supra note 3, § 17.03(a).
7. TARLOCK, supra note 5, § 5:88; see Goplerud, supra note 3, § 17.03(b).
Colorado, Hawaii, and Montana do not have forfeiture statutes and continue to use
common law abandonment for loss of water rights. Nevada recently repealed its
forfeiture statute. See infra notes 74 & 81 and accompanying text. Both Colorado and
Montana have statutes that set up a presumption of abandonment from ten years of
non-use. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-402(11) (2000); MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-404(2)
(1999).
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should be fully governed by the water codes. In particular, can the
codes modify vested rights by providing a new means of loss of that
right, without running afoul of legal challenges? The argument is that
a right that one can lose only by abandonment, including examination
of the user's intent, is more secure and thus more valuable than a right
that one can lose simply by non-use. Many western water rights are old
enough to pre-date the various states' comprehensive water laws, and
thus whether or not these rights are subject to statutory forfeiture is an
important question. The purpose of this article is to compare the
various approaches to applying statutory forfeiture to pre-code rights,
and to suggest the better approach to those states that have not yet
squarely faced the issue.
Part II discusses the extent and importance of pre-code water
rights, and the potential significance of enforcing forfeiture provisions
against unused rights. Part III explains how the statutes changed the
pre-code law and describes the current treatment of forfeiture in
various western water codes. Part IV compares and evaluates the
approaches of those states that have addressed the application of
Part V
statutory forfeiture provisions to pre-code water rights.
concludes that applying statutory forfeiture equally to pre- and postcode rights is the better reasoned approach.
II. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF PRE-CODE WATER RIGHTS
Why does it matter if states hold pre-code water rights to a
different standard regarding loss by non-use than later acquired
rights? The manner of loss matters because pre-code rights are
significant and extensive in many states. Western states adopted the
earliest water codes at the very end of the 1800s, but many of these
states did not comprehensively codify their water laws until well into
the 20th century.8 By that time, appropriators had acquired rights to
use water in many areas over several decades. Many streams of the
West were already fully appropriated before the states were even
admitted to the union, much less before they had adopted
comprehensive water codes.
For example, in Colorado, miners and settlers began appropriating
water in the Lower Arkansas River Valley in the 1850s and 60s.' By
1883, the river's summertime flows were fully appropriated.0 In fact,
the latest water right that reliably receives Arkansas River water in the
summer has a priority date of 1874. Colorado became a territory in

8. See infra note 36.
9. LAWRENCE J. MAcDONNELL,

FROM RECLAMATION

TO SUSTAINABILI:

WATER,

In fact,
appropriations from the Arkansas River by settlers dated from as early as 1832 and
1847, but these early settlements were not successful and the diversions were thus not
continuous, but re-initiated some years later. JAMES N. CORBRIDGE, JR. & TERESA A.
RICE, VRANESH'S COLORADO WATER LAW 4 (revised ed. 1999).
10. MACDONNELL, supra note 9, at 26.
11. Id.
AGRIcULTURE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT IN THE AMERICAN WEST 18-19 (1999).
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1861, but did not become a state until 1876 and adopted its first water
code in 1881."
Colorado is not unique in the importance and extent of pre-code
water rights. In California, important water law history emerged from
water disputes in the Kern River valley with James Ben-Ali Haggin on
one side and Henry Miller and Charles Lux on the other. Years
before the state's comprehensive water code of 1914, these early
entrepreneurs amassed huge landholdings and associated water rights
claims amounting to millions of acres during the 1870s."4
Congress adopted the Reclamation Act in 1902 to foster irrigation
in the western states. Several reclamation projects began soon after
that, resulting in extensive appropriative irrigation rights that predate
many of the applicable water codes. The Newlands Project in Nevada
began in 1904 as the first reclamation project in the country. 5 The
project resulted in the irrigation of over 70,000 acres. The Newlands
Project has been the subject of both state and federal court actions for
many years, attempting to sort out all of the claims to water from both
the Truckee and Carson Rivers that reach back to 1902 and even
earlier, well before Nevada's 1913 water code. 6
The Klamath Project in southern Oregon began in 1905.7 Oregon
adopted its water code in 1909. A general stream adjudication is
currently underway in the Klamath Basin to adjudicate pre-code rights,
involving some 25,000 claimants, some of whose claims date back
before the reclamation project to as early as the 1840s."8 Major
adjudications are also underway in Idaho, Washington, Montana,
Wyoming, Arizona, and New Mexico. 9 In all of these adjudications,
the declaration and quantification of extensive pre-code rights will
affect significant amounts of water. °

Id. at 19; CORBRIDGE & RIcE, supra note 9, at 7, 19.
13. See discussion of the legendary Lux v. Haggin litigation in JOSEPH L. SAX, ET AL.,
12.

LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES: CASES AND MATERIALs 295-301 (3d ed. 2000).

14. Id. at 295. Although California adopted irrigation statutes in 1872, a truly
comprehensive codification was still more than three decades in the future. See 1
WELLS A. HUTCHINS, WATER RIGHTS LAWS IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES 290 (1971).
15. JOHN M. TOWNLEY, TURN THIS WATER INTO GOLD: THE STORY OF THE NEWLANDS
PROJECT 54 (Nev. Historical Society 1977); DEP'T OF CONSERVATION AND NAT. RES., DIV.
OF WATER PLANNING, TRUCKEE RIVER CHRONOLOGY: A CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF THE
TRUCKEE RIVER AND RELATED WATER ISSUES 24, 26 (1995).

16. The Newlands Project irrigation rights date from 1902. Some area irrigators,
however, also claimed earlier appropriation dates, and the Pyramid Lake Paiutes
claimed rights predating settlement and irrigation, with a priority date of 1859. DEP'T
OF CONSERVATION AND NAT. RES., supra note 15, at 13-14, 19, 27.

17.

Sue McClurg, The Klamath River Basin: A Microcosm of Water in the West, in

WESTERN WATER, at 4, 7 (2000).

18. United States v.Oregon, 44 F.3d 758, 762 (9th Cir. 1994); see also McClurg,
supra note 17, at 15. See generally Peter G. Scott, State Certification of Inchoate Water Rights
on the Upper Lost River: A Prelude to the Klamath Adjudication, 13J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 475
(1998).
19. See Colloquy, Dividing the Waters: A Century of Adjudicating Western Rivers and
Streams (Oct. 1997) (unpublished presentation, Big Sky, Mont.) (on file with author).
20. See id.
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Since pre-code rights lay claim to significant quantities of water,
whether or not those rights are subject to statutory forfeiture has
important consequences. If water rights holders can lose pre-code
rights only by abandonment, but can lose post-code rights by
forfeiture, post-code rights become second-class water rights. Further,
retaining common law abandonment for large blocks of water rights
hinders state water allocation agencies in achieving comprehensive
water management because there is no definite point at which unused
water becomes available for re-appropriation. Finally, even if water
managers try to clean up the books by seeking out unused water rights
for cancellation, it is a much more difficult, and thus likely more
expensive,job to prove abandonment than forfeiture."
Admittedly, most western water resource agencies are not queuing
up to seek out and declare forfeitures of unused water rights.
Although Colorado seems to have a systematic approach"3 to getting
unused water rights off the books, other states usually confront and
resolve claims of forfeiture or abandonment only when pressed to do
so by competing water rights claimants, such as in an application for
transfer of water rights when the amount proposed to be transferred is
challenged.24 However, as western states seek additional water supplies
to meet growing demands, cleaning up "paper water ri hts" that have
Thus, state
in fact been forfeited is one area needing attention.
attention to forfeiture will likely increase during the next decade.

21. Goplerud, supranote 4, at 436.
22. See Reed D. Benson, Maintainingthe Status Quo: ProtectingEstablishedWater Uses
in the Pacific Northwest, Despite the Rules of Prior Appropriation, 28 ENVTL. L. 881, 890
(1998) (detailing northwest states' avoidance of strict enforcement of water rights'
terms, including forfeiture); Krista Koehl, Partial Forfeiture of Water Rights: Oregon
Compromises TraditionalPrinciples to Achieve Flexibility, 28 ENVrL. L. 1137, 1146 (1998)
(discussing how Oregon agency does not seek out forfeitures; more generally, recent
Oregon statutory change "backtracks" on partial forfeiture, allowing water users to
reduce water use without forfeiture as long as they are "ready, willing and able" to use
full amount of paper right).
23. In Colorado, water division engineers publish a "decennial" list every ten years
that lists water rights believed to have been abandoned in the past ten years. The
record owners of the water rights are notified, and must file protests detailing factual
and legal arguments that show why they should be removed from the list. The water
court then tries the matter, and enters a decree either confirming abandonment of
the rights or recognizing the continuing validity of the water rights. Thus, Colorado
subjects its water rights to a regular periodic process of review for abandonment.
COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 37-92-401 to -602 (2000). However, Colorado law retains common
law abandonment rather than applying strict forfeiture. Thus, although Colorado
maintains a systematic listing of water rights presumed to have been abandoned, the
state must still have a full trial to show both non-use and intent to abandon. See, e.g.,
Haystack Ranch, L.L.C. v. Fazzio, 997 P.2d 548, 551 (Colo. 2000) (detailing efforts to
prove abandonment from non-use of two water rights for twenty-two years and fiftyfour years, respectively).
24. See Neuman, supra note 3, at 960.
25. Cf WESTERN WATER POL'Y REVIEw ADVISORY COMM'N, WATER IN THE WEST: THE
CHALLENGE FOR THE NEXT CENTURY 5-20 (1998) (discussing future directions states

should examine with respect to water rights); see also Santa Fe Trail Ranches Prop.
Owners Ass'n v. Simpson, 990 P.2d 46, 54-55 (Colo. 1999).
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III. WATER CODES: CHANGES TO PRE-CODE LAW AND
CODIFICATION OF FORFEITURE
The adoption of the prior appropriation doctrine and the eventual
codification of the doctrine in water codes in the western states were
both inventions born of necessity. The prior appropriation doctrine
began as custom and practice in western mining camps. The miners
followed a rule of "first in time, first in right," when it came to
recognizing priorities in mining claims. As "the days of the pan and
shovel gave way to ditches and sluiceboxes," the miners applied26 the
same rules to resolve disputes over water as they had to the land. In
using a priority system of allocation, early miners and settlers adapted
to two immutable facts that made the common law riparian doctrine
followed in the eastern states unworkable for the western states: aridity
2
The relative lack of precipitation pulled
and the vast public domainY.
the rug out from under the riparian doctrine, which depended on a
relatively abundant resource that could be divided among all users in
reasonable shares. The fact that the miners and other settlers were
initially trespassers on huge expanses of federal land meant that there
were few true riparian owners who could claim riparian rights, even if
they could find a stream on which to locate. Thus, the realities of the
West necessitated a different system of water allocation.
However, adopting prior appropriation as the allocating principle
was only the beginning of clarifying water-use rights. As long as water
rights were simply acquired by diverting and using the water, with only
minimal requirements for recording the claims, uncertainty continued
28
Water rights claims, if recorded at all, were
to plague water use.
scattered among various county offices, with no central repository of
claims.2 9 Filing a notice did not necessarily mean that the diversion
had been completed and still existed. 0 Nothing prevented water users
from grossly overstating their claim. 3' Many streams quickly became
overappropriated, either on paper or in reality, and no legal
mechanisms existed to sort out valid claims and decree priorities
except expensive, and not entirely effective, private adjudications
among disputing parties.
Some water users and western legislators began to recognize the
need for legislation to assert a measure of state control over water
26. DUNBAR, supra note 2, at 61.
27. See TIMOTHY D. TREGARTHEN, Water in Colorado: Fear and Loathing in the
Marketplace, in WATER RIGHTS: SCARCE RESOURCE ALLOCATION, BUREAUCRACY, AND THE

ENVIRONMENT, supranote 2, at 119, 122-23. See generally TARLOCK, supranote 5, § 5:4; 1
CLESSON S. KINNEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF IRRIGATION AND WATER RIGHTS §§ 585-

598, (2d ed. 1912); HUTCHINS, supra note 14, at 158-59, 166.
28. DUNBAR, supra note 2, at 86; Goplerud, supranote 4.

29. DUNBAR, supra note 2, at 86-87; HUTCHINS, supra note 14, at 293.
30. HUTCHINS, supra note 14, at 294-95; DUNBAR, supra note 2, at 87.
31. HUTCHINS, supra note 14, at 294-95 (the aggregate of all claims in California
represents enough moisture to submerge the continent) (citation omitted); DUNBAR,
supra note 2, at 98-99, 106.
32. SeeDUNBAR, supra note 2, at 101-02, 127; HUTCHINS, supra note 14, at 294-98.
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resources and to regularize the acquisition, quantification, and
retention of water rights by private parties. 3 The first state to adopt a
comprehensive water code was Wyoming in 1890. The "essence" of the
Wyoming system was "the subordination of the appropriator to the
welfare of the state."04 Key provisions of the Wyoming laws were a
declaration of state ownership over all waters of the state, a permit
system as the exclusive means of acquiring a water right, a requirement
to determine water availability and to consider the public interest in
granting new water rights, and an adjudication
5 process to sort out and
decree competing water rights and priorities.
Over the next few decades, the codification of water laws in other
western states followed Wyoming's code. Some of the states copied
Wyoming's code, drafted by Elwood Mead; others used a version
drafted originally for Washington by Morris Bien; and still other states
combined and adapted various provisions to suit their own
preferences.3 ' Nevertheless, common themes were present, such as
clarifying the process for acquiring water rights, and confirming what
valid rights were in fact outstanding and what water was available for
future appropriation.
Thus, most of the water codes followed a similar model. The state
declared public ownership over the water, adopted prior
appropriation as the governing principle of water-use rights, required
permission from a state agency or official in order to initiate a water
right from that time forward, established beneficial use as the basis,
measure, and limit of the right, provided that non-use for a period of
time would constitute forfeiture, and established some system of
adjudication to test and determine the validity, priority, and amount of
all water right claims to a particular source."
Shortly after the adoption of the Oregon water code in 1909, the
Oregon State Engineer proclaimed, albeit a bit dramatically, the
33. In fact, the federal government also encouraged the codification of western
water practices and customs by refusing to build reclamation projects in a state until it
had a mechanism to sort out the validity of its water rights claims. Frederick Newell,
the first chief engineer of the Reclamation Service, observed that "[t]he laws of many
of the States and Territories relating to water are in a more or less chaotic condition."
DUNBAR, supra note 2, at 115-16. Since this prevented the Reclamation Service from
determining the amount of unappropriated water available for federal projects, the
Service made eventual reformation of the laws a condition of project approval. Id.
34. DUNBAR, supra note 2, at 109.
35. Id. at 109-10.
36. Wyoming enacted its comprehensive water laws in 1890. Robert E. Beck,
Introduction and Background, in 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 1, §
11.03(b) (3) n.67. The Wyoming code served as a blueprint for other states, with some
variations: Arizona (1919), California (1914), Idaho (1903), Kansas (1917), Nebraska
(1895), Nevada (1905), New Mexico (1905), North Dakota (1905), Oklahoma (1905),
Oregon (1909), South Dakota (1905), Texas (1913), Utah (1903), Washington (1917).
Id.
37. See generally DUNBAR, supra note 2, ch. 10 (discussing diffusion of the Wyoming
system through the western states).
38. Id.
39. Id.; see also HUTCHINS, supra note 14, at 298-306.
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emergence of a new era of water allocation:
Under the old law, no foundation existed for titles to
water. Utter confusion prevailed as to the legal status of a
water right. Litigation among water users grew to such an
extent as to prove a serious burden upon irrigated
agriculture. Dams and flumes were destroyed and lives
threatened in community quarrels to secure a proper division
of streams. Under such conditions capital declined to invest,
and home-seekers went to other states where the purchase of
a water right did not mean the purchase of a lawsuit. To
remedy these conditions, a complete code of law was enacted
which became effective February 24, 1909.

Its enactment is of as great importance to Oregon as was
the making of the "Doomsday Book" in 1085, by William the
Conqueror, which was the first attempt in England to
systematize land titles.4 °

The Wyoming Supreme Court provided a similar version of the story:
[T]he cultivation and even the occupation of the lands
within the territory had been attended with the expenditure
of much capital and labor, and the very existence of the
homes of a large class of citizens, as well as the
productiveness of the soil, depended upon the security to be
afforded the appropriations of water which had been made;
and in view of the many rights already accrued, and the
inception of new ones which would necessarily accompany
the continued growth of the territory, the welfare of the
entire people became deeply concerned in a wise,
economical, and orderly regulation of the use of the waters
of the public streams. It was realized that more adequate
laws were demanded, to duly protect this important
industrial interest, give stability to its values, assist in a
desirable conservation of the waters, and avoid confusion and
difficulty in their distribution.4'
The codification
of water laws had two primary and
complementary purposes: (1) formal recognition and adoption of the
customary practices that formed the evolving prior appropriation
doctrine throughout the West; and (2) elimination of the unavoidable

40. Third Biennial Report of the State Engineer to the Governor of Oregon for a
period beginning December 1, 1908, and ending November 30, 1910, quoted in RIcK
BAsTAscH, WATERS OF OREGON 44 (1998).
41. Farm Inv. Co. v. Carpenter, 61 P. 258, 260 (Wyo. 1900).
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uncertainties and chaos resulting from allowing important property
rights to be gained by custom rather than by clearly stated positive
law.42 Both of these purposes served the larger goal of enhancing the
stability and security of western water rights, and aiding investment in
land and generally promoting western economic development.
The codes ratified the pre-code customs in several ways. For
example, "first in time, first in right," remains the main theme. And,
the codes still require that an appropriator obtain water rights by
beneficial use of water and diligence in completing and maintaining
appropriations. But, the codes also altered pre-code practice in several
important respects. Rather than merely posting notice near the
intended diversion point and then taking the water, the appropriator
must file for a permit with the state agency." The state agency can
deny or limit permits in the public interest or, in most states, because
the stream is over-appropriated." Thus, one can no longer simply
Finally, many states
divert water and have a legitimate appropriation.
water rights for non-use.
forfeit
could
that
statutes
introduced
By replacing a custom-based set of practices with strict statutory
provisions, including permit requirements, elimination of looselydefined riparian rights, and short statutory forfeiture periods, the
western states chose "crystals" over "mud."46 Choosing crystalline rules
for managing water in the West reflected the notion that "the more
important a given kind of thing becomes for us, the more likely we are
47
to have these hard-edged rules to manage it." Western water was
simply too scarce and too valuable to be allocated according to muddy
legal doctrines like the "reasonableness" of the riparian system or the
subjective intent associated with common law abandonment.
Of course, every way in which the water codes altered the pre-code
custom and practice had the potential to threaten vested pre-code
rights (assuming that the codes would be applied to those rights) or to
create two different classes of water rights (if the codes were only to
apply to post-code rights). However, the courts have upheld the codes
in nearly every instance where the codes have been challenged for
their effect on pre-code rights.
For example, in Oregon, as in many other states, water users
challenged provisions in the early water code eliminating unexercised
riparian rights. The state clearly recognized both riparian and
appropriative rights before the 1909 code adopted prior appropriation
as the exclusive method of obtaining a water right from that date
42.

See 1 HUTCHINS, supra note 14, at 293.

43.
44.

See Goplerud, supra note 4, at 170.
Id. at 175.

§ 576 (3 ed. 1911).
L. REv. 577 (1988)
STAN.
40
Law,
Property
in
Mud
and
Crystals
M.
Rose,
46. Carol
(discussing how when resources are relatively abundant, muddy legal rules of
allocation (such as the riparian doctrine's reasonable share of water) will suffice; but
when resources are scarce, such as water in the arid west, more rigid, crystalline rules
tend to replace the muddy rules).
47. Id. at 577.
45.

SAMUEL C. WIEL, WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN STATES
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forward." In a 1914 case, the Oregon Supreme Court upheld the fiveyear-old code against several constitutional challenges, including a
claim that its elimination of riparian rights not yet put to use was an
unconstitutional taking. 9
The court noted the savings clause
contained in the code, which declared that "nothing herein contained
shall be so construed as to take away or impair the vested right of any
person, firm, corporation, or association, to any water."50 The court
further emphasized that riparians had a valid and valuable property
right that had arisen under previously prevailing laws." However, the
court also recognized that, like all property, riparian rights are subject
to reasonable regulation." The court then found that it was not an
unconstitutional taking to limit the rights of riparians to water actually
applied to beneficial use."
Ten years later, the Oregon Supreme Court entertained another
challenge to the limitation of riparian rights by the water code.54 The
court emphasized the authority of a state to change the common law
over time and suit it to the state's particular conditions. The court
quoted the Arizona Supreme Court with approval: "riparian rights...
cannot be said to be vested in such a sense as that they may not be
subsequently abrogated by statute, at any rate when the riparian owner
has made no use of the water permitted him at common law."5
The court also gleaned support for the state's authority from a
decision of the United States Supreme Court: "it is undoubtedly true
that a state may change its common-law rule as to every stream within
its dominion, and permit the appropriation of the flowing water for
such purposes as it deems wise. X The court did not sugar coat the
fact that the water code effected a material change in the common law
previously governing riparian rights. Rather, the court declared that
as long as actual water use was protected and preserved, the code did
not impair anyone's actual water rights:
The recognition by law of the right of an appropriation is
of necessity an infringement or curtailment of the commonlaw rule as to a riparian owner.... When the state of Oregon
recognized the right of appropriation of the waters of the
streams of the state, the old riparian doctrine of "continuous
flow" was materially changed.

48.

CHAPIN D. CLARK, WATER RESOURcES RES. INST., SURVEY OF OREGON'S WATER

LAws 93-95, 122 (1983).
49. In reWillow Creek, 144 P. 505 (Or. 1914).
50. Id. at 510.
51. Id. at 515-16.
52. Id. at 517.
53. Id.
54. In reHood River, 227 P. 1065 (Or. 1924).
55. Id. at 1083 (quoting Boquillas Land & Cattle Co. v. Curtis, 89 P. 504, 507 (Ariz.
1907)).
56. Id. at 1084 (citing United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S.
690, 702 (1899)).
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[I] t is plain that the common-law rule ... or riparian
doctrine, may be changed by statute, except as such change
may affect some vested right....
...

No one has any property in the water itself, but a simple
usufruct. It was within the province of the Legislature, by the
act of 1909, to define a vested right of a riparian owner, or to
establish a rule as to when and under what condition and to
what extent a vested right should be deemed to be created in
a riparian proprietor. 7
Thus, Oregon courts found that it was acceptable and
constitutional to codify the prior appropriation doctrine and limit
riparian rights to those already being exercised at the time of the
code's adoption. Other states mirrored Oregon's reasoning." For
example, the Washington Supreme Court, in the case of Deadman Creek
Drainage Basin v. Abbott, held that the forfeiture of unexercised
riparian rights under the 1917 water code was not an unconstitutional
taking. 9 Stating "[tlhere is no indication that rights which vested
before the water code were to be excluded from general water rights
the Washington
adjudications or otherwise treated differently,"
Supreme Court adopted a pragmatic stance on water use. As the court
the
noted, the "steady and gradual evolution" of water law favored
powers on water use.61
constitutionality of imposing state regulatory
The challenges mounted against the early water codes on behalf of
riparian rights holders were some of the most significant. However,
courts also upheld other provisions of the codes against challenges.
For instance, the provisions of the Oregon code requiring water users

to "take measures for the ascertainment, certifying, and recording of
their water rights" were initially attacked as "arbitrary, unreasonable,
[and] unduly burdensome" as applied to existing users and therefore a
violation of due process. The Oregon Supreme Court found instead
57. Id. at 1086-87.
58. California and Oklahoma were the only two states where the courts balked at
statutory termination of riparian rights. See Waters of Long Valley Creek Stream Sys. v.
Ramelli, 599 P.2d 656 (Cal. 1979); Franco-American Charolaise, Ltd. v. Okla. Water
Res. Bd., 855 P.2d 568 (Okla. 1990).
59. Deadman Creek Drainage Basin v. Abbott, 694 P.2d 1071, 1077 (Wash. 1985)
(en banc). The court found that fifteen years after the code's adoption was a
reasonable period of time for riparians to exercise their rights or lose them. Id. at
1076.
60. Id. at 1075.
61. Id. at 1077; see also Boquillas Land & Cattle Co. v. Curtis, 89 P. 504 (Ariz. 1907),
aff'd, 213 U.S. 339 (1909) (upholding. statutory termination of unused riparian rights).
62. In reWillow Creek, 144 P. 505, 514 (Or. 1914).
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that such requirements were not only allowable, but "salutary and in
the interest of an orderly regulation of the use of water.""
Thus, with few exceptions, state courts ratified significant changes
wrought by the water codes, even to the extent of eliminating riparian
rights that an owner had not yet put to beneficial use. Yet, when it
came to applying statutory forfeiture provisions to pre-code rights,
seemingly a less significant change, the states split into two
approaches. Nevada courts held that it would not apply statutory
forfeiture to pre-code rights, and those rights would continue to be
divested only by common law abandonment. Arizona tried to
accomplish the same end by statute. Another group of states,
including Nebraska, Washington, Texas, California, Oregon, Idaho,
New Mexico, and South Dakota, have allowed statutory forfeiture to
divest both pre- and post-code rights. The next section discusses each
of these approaches.
IV. THE APPLICATION OF STATUTORY FORFEITURE TO PRECODE RIGHTS
A. STATES TREATING PRE-CODE RIGHTS DIFFERENTLY

1. Nevada
Nevada adopted its water code in 1913.
code stated:

Section 8 of the water

[A]nd in case the owner or owners of any such ditch,
canal or reservoir shall fail to use the water therefrom for
beneficial purposes for which right exists during any five
successive years, the right to use shall be considered as having
been abandoned, and they shall forfeit all water rights,
easements and privileges appurtenant thereto, and the water
formerly appropriated by them may be again appropriated
for beneficial use, the same as if such ditch, canal or reservoir
had never been constructed.6
In 1877, Joseph Yount began diverting waters from Manse Spring
in Nye County, Nevada, for domestic purposes and for irrigation of
300 acres. This use continued until 1929, when Jean Cazaurang,
Yount's successor in interest, died. During the next seven years, a
caretaker hired by Cazaurang's estate used only a small amount of
water on the land. In 1937, at the request of the parties who
succeeded to the Cazaurang estate's interest, the state engineer began
an adjudication of the rights to use the waters of Manse Spring. The
trial court awarded a water right to Cazaurang's successors in spite of

63. Id.
64. 1913 NEV. STAT. 140, § 8, amended by 1917 NEV. STAT. 190, § 1.
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the seven years of non-use, and another party to the adjudication
appealed. The appellant argued that the Yount/Cazaurang property's
had been lost under the five-year statutory forfeiture
water right
65
period.
The Nevada Supreme Court refused to apply the statutory
forfeiture provision to divest the appellee's water rights, because those
rights had vested before adoption of the statute in 1913.66 The Court
began its analysis with the water code's "savings clause," which
provided:
Nothing in this act contained shall impair the vested right of
any person to the use of water, nor shall the right of any
person to take and use water be impaired or affected by any
of the provisions of this act where appropriations have been
initiated in accordance with law prior to the approval of this
67
act.
The Court then posed the question: "Can a right be impaired by
providing a different method for its loss than had theretofore
existed?" Before the code's adoption, an appropriator could lose a
water right by abandonment, in which "the intent of the water user is
controlling. "69 Under statutory forfeiture, the water right could be lost
by five years of non-use, "irrespective of the intent," and the Court
found that to be "a much stricter and more absolute procedure than
loss by abandonment" that "certainly takes away much of the stability
and security of the right to the continued use of such water.'° On that
basis, the court concluded that the change in method of loss of rights
7
constituted an impairment of the early-acquired water right. "
In 1992, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals revisited the Manse
2
Spring holding in United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co.1 Although

not discussed in detail, the court confirmed the distinction formulated
in Manse Spring. The Ninth Circuit seemed to agree that "a water right
that can be lost through mere non-use is something less than a water
3
right that may be lost only through intentional abandonment." Thus,
Nevada law took a stand squarely in the camp of giving pre-code rights

65.

In reManse Spring, 108 P.2d 311, 314 (Nev. 1940).

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. at 316.
Id. at 315-16 (citation omitted).
Id. at 316.
Id.
Id.

71. In reManse Spring, 108 P.2d 311, 316 (Nev. 1940).
72. United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 983 F.2d 1487 (9th Cir. 1992).
73. Id. at 1496. The Alpine court reviewed a slightly different savings provision than
the Manse court: "Nothing contained in this chapter shall impair the vested right of
any person to the use of water, nor shall the right of any person to take and use water
be impaired or affected by any of the provisions of this chapter where appropriations
have been initiated in accordance with law prior to March 22, 1913." NEv. REv. STAT. §

533.085(1) (1999).
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special protection against loss by non-use."
2. Arizona
The only other state to attempt explicitly to exempt pre-code water
rights from divestiture by forfeiture is Arizona.
Arizona's
comprehensive water code was originally enacted in 1919." The Code
included a five-year forfeiture provision, 6 and also included a
provision protecting pre-existing rights from impairment.77 In 1995,
the Arizona legislature amended the water code to declare that precode rights would not be subject to forfeiture proceedings.", Thus,
Arizona's choice of how to treat pre-code rights became a matter of
statute. However, the statutory resolution was short-lived, as the
Arizona Supreme Court declared the provision unconstitutional in
1999.71
The Arizona court's discussion of the legislature's attempt to
exempt pre-code rights from forfeiture is illuminating. The court said:
It is true that even vested rights may be regulated.... The
Legislature may certainly enact laws that apply to rights
vested before the date of the statute. Such laws, however,
may only change the legal consequences of future events....

The Legislature may not, however, change the legal
consequence of events completed before the statute's
enactment. For example, the Legislature cannot revive rights
that have been lost or terminated under the law as it existed
at the time of an event and that have vested in otherwise
junior appropriators."
This discussion contains three important points.

First, the court

makes what should be an obvious point-that a vested property right,

74. In fact, as of the 1999 legislature session, Nevada may have decided that
common law abandonment will apply to all water rights, since the five-year forfeiture
statute has been repealed. The repeal was part of a larger legislative package of
changes to the water statutes, and the legislative history does not illuminate the reason
for this particular change. See Editor's Notes to NEv. REv. STAT. § 533.060 (2000).
75. See 1919 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 164 (current version at ARiz. REv. STAT. § 45-101 to
-400 (1999)).
76. See ARiz. REV. STAT. § 45-141(C) (1999) (original version at 1919 Ariz. Sess.
Laws ch. 164).
77. ARIZ. REv. STAT. § 45-171 (1999). The version of this provision adopted in 1919
read: "Nothing in this act contained, shall impair the vested rights of any person,
association or corporation to the use of water." 1919 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 164, § 56.
78. ARIz. REV. STAT. § 45-141(C) (1999) ("This subsection or any other statutory
forfeiture by nonuse shall not apply to a water right initiated beforeJune 12, 1919").
79. San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Super. Ct., 972 P.2d 179, 201 (Ariz. 1999). For a
discussion of this case, see generally Sean E. O'Day, SAN CA RLOSAPAcIJE TRUBE v. SuPERJOR
COURT. REJECTING LEGIsLATIvE FAvoRIsM IN WATER RIGHT ALLOCATIONS, 4 U. DENV.

WATERL. REV. 29 (2000).
80. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 972 P.2d at 189 (emphasis in original) (citations
omitted).
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just because it is vested, is not free of future regulation by the state. A
contrary rule would prevent the state from properly and fairly
exercising its police power.
Second, state regulation of vested rights is permissible when the
regulation deals with legal consequences of future events. Conversely,
the state might impair vested rights if the state tried to reach back to
past events and attach new and different legal consequences to those
events than existed at the time the events occurred.
Third, the court noted that the specific problem with the
legislature's attempt to save pre-code rights from forfeiture was that
doing so might interfere with someone else's vested water rights. If
certain pre-code rights had in fact been lost due to non-use, and other
appropriators had since acquired valid rights to use that water, then to
revive the forfeited right by legislative decree would be to unlawfully
divest the juniors of vested rights.8
With the rejection of Arizona's statutory exemption by its highest
court, Nevada stands alone as the only state that has explicitly and
successfully exempted pre-code water rights from the application of
Of course, not all states have
statutory forfeiture provisions.
necessarily confronted the question directly, or even if they have, the
reported opinions may not reflect the issue. Of the other states that
have some record of taking up the issue, nine have treated pre-code
rights the same as post-code permitted rights for forfeiture purposes.
The remainder of this section describes those states' approach,
followed by an evaluation of the various treatments.
B. STATES APPLYING FORFEITURE PROVISIONS EQUALLY TO PRE- AND
POST- CODE RIGHTS

1. Nebraska
Nebraska began comprehensive water regulation with the
Irrigation Law of 1895, and by at least 1919, the code included a threeyear forfeiture provision. In the 1951 case of In re Birdwood Irrigation
District, the Nebraska court held that pre-code rights were susceptible
to divestiture by forfeiture.s The right at issue in Birdwood had been
adjudicated in 1898, and given an 1893 priority date, two years before
the code's adoption."' The court's holding rested on traditional

81. From 1919 to 1995, the Arizona statute contained a forfeiture provision, with
no reference to the date a right was initiated. Over the years, significant debate
occurred concerning whether the forfeiture statute applied to pre-code rights, but a
court had never addressed the question. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF HOUSE BILL 2276, 1st
Sess., at 2 (Ariz. 1995). If Nevada's recent repeal of its forfeiture law is applied
retroactively (to eliminate the effect of the five-year forfeiture period even during the
time it was on the books), the law will raise the same question of unconstitutionality as
the Arizona law. See supra note 74.
82. DUNBAR, supra note 2, at 111; NEB. REv. STAT. §46-229 (1998).
83. In reBirdwood Irrigation Dist., 46 N.W.2d 884, 888 (Neb. 1951).
84. Id. at 887.
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principles of prior appropriation and beneficial use: "It is the policy of
the law in all the arid states to compel an economical use of the waters
of natural streams." 5 To achieve economy in water use, "[t]he policy
of the law is to require a continued beneficial use of appropriated
waters to avert their loss under the nonuser provisions of the irrigation
statutes." 6 The court noted specifically that when the right was
adjudicated it was clearly the law that ceasing to use water beneficially
could result in loss of the right."7 Further, the court noted that a 1914
Nebraska case had specifically upheld the constitutionality of the
forfeiture statute, even though it applied to both past and future
appropriations.8 Finally, the court noted that its decision "in no
manner changes a substantive right," but "merely sustains the
procedural remedy provided by the Legislature for enforcing a
condition inherently in the appropriation to the effect that the rights
attained thereby could be lost by nonuser. " "
Thirty years later, in 1981, several water rights holders asked the
Nebraska Supreme Court to overrule Birdwood, but the court declined
to do so and affirmed the application of the forfeiture provision to pre1895 water rights.90 In addition to restating the policy upholding
Birdwood (compelling an economical use of water), the court
emphasized that the state's police power and constitutional provisions
concerning water regulation gave the state ample authority for
subsequent adoption of reasonable regulations. The court stated that
"[t]o exempt from such control water rights acquired prior to the date
of the act created for the specific purpose of preventing waste would
be to ignore the mandate of our Constitution and make ineffective the
very end sought to be obtained." 9'
2. Washington
The State of Washington enacted its comprehensive water code in
1917.92 Like Nevada and most other states, Washington statutes
recognized and affirmed existing vested rights: "Nothing contained in
this chapter shall be construed to lessen, enlarge, or modify the
existing rights of any riparian93 owner, or any existing right acquired by
appropriation, or otherwise.

Washington law addresses the issue of forfeiture of pre-code rights
directly, with the following statutory language:

85. Id.

86. Id. at 888.
87. Id. at 887-88.
88. Id. at 888 (citing Kersenbrock v. Boyes, 145 N.W. 837 (Neb. 1914)).

89.
90.
91.
92.

In re Birdwood Irrigation Dist., 46 N.W.2d 884, 889 (Neb. 1951).
In reWater Appropriation No. 442A, 313 N.W.2d 271, 274 (Neb. 1981).
Id.
See 1917 Wash. Laws ch. 117 (current version at WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. §§

90.03.005 to -611 (West 1999)).
93. WAsH. REv. CODEANN. § 90.03.010 (West 1999).
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Any person entitled to divert or withdraw waters of the state
through any appropriation authorized by enactments of the
legislature prior to enactment of chapter 117, Laws of 1917,
or by custom, or by general adjudication, who abandons the
same, or who voluntarily fails, without sufficient cause, to
beneficially use all or any part of said right... for any period
of five successive years after the effective date of this act, shall
relinquish such right or portion thereof ......
However, this provision was not part of the original water code, but was
added in 1967.95 This provision withstood a takings challenge in 1993
in State Department of Ecology v. Grimes in which the Washington
Supreme Court rejected a pre-code water right holder's argument that
the diminishment of his water right in a general adjudication was
unconstitutional.
The water rights at issue in Grimes predated the
Washington water code by eleven years. However, the court held
application of the relinquishment provision of the five-year forfeiture
statute to these pre-code rights was not an unconstitutional taking.97
The holding of the Grimes court is entirely consistent with the
history of beneficial use as a basic component of an appropriative
right: a water fight is only valid where an appropriator beneficially,
continuously, and diligently uses the water. Thus, there can be no
"taking" of a water right where an appropriator is not using water,
because no valid right exists.
The water referee's finding of
diminishment was a result of the voluntary failure of the right holder
to apply water beneficially; such is a permissible limitation on water
rights. Thus, the Court recognized that the legislature specifically
limited all water rights to an application of beneficial use. 98
3. Texas
Texas follows the approach represented by Nebraska and
Washington. The Texas Code is typical in that it contains both a
statutory forfeiture provision and a non-impairment of vested rights
provision.

In Texas Water Rights Commission v. Wright, the Supreme

Court of Texas considered the state's cancellation of water rights
issued in 1918 and 1928, but not exercised from 1954 (when a flood
washed out the diversion pumps) until 1971. 99 When the appropriator
initiated the water uses, the applicable Texas statute provided for loss
only by "willful abandonment" that included an intent element.'00 The

94. Id. § 90.14.160. Two other statutory provisions also apply five-year forfeiture
periods to riparian rights and permitted rights. See id. §§ 90.14.170, .180.
95. See id. § 90.14.160.
96. State Dep't of Ecology v. Grimes, 852 P.2d 1044 (Wash. 1993) (en banc).
97. Id. at 1054-55.
98. Id.
99. Tex. Water Rights Comm'n v. Wright, 464 S.W.2d 642, 644 (Tex. 1971).
100. Id. at 644. Strictly speaking, the water rights at issue in Wright were permitted
rights under an earlier code, rather than true pre-code rights.
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Texas legislature later amended the statute to include a ten-year
01
The court rejected the water users'
statutory forfeiture period.°
argument that subjecting them to the later-enacted forfeiture statute,
instead of the pre-existing abandonment statute, would be
The court acknowledged that "a matured
unconstitutional.
appropriation right to water is a vested right." 03 However, the court
further emphasized the right is to use the water, and that "[t]he
permittees did not acquire the right of non-use of water."0 4 Thus,
applying the statutory forfeiture period as a means of enforcing the
ongoing beneficial use requirement was not unconstitutional." The
Texas court specifically declined to follow Nevada's decision in Manse
Spring, although urged upon them by the water users.0 The court,
therefore, upheld the cancellation of the rights due to forfeiture by
ten years of non-use. 07
4. California
California adopted its comprehensive water code in 1914."'
However, the state had statutes covering various aspects of water use
dating from the late 1800s. In 1895, a state statute provided that water
rights could be forfeited for non-use, but did not specify a time
period.' 00 In Smith v. Hawkins, the California Supreme Court found
that the statute was meant to be a forfeiture provision rather than an
abandonment provision. In the absence of a legislatively established
time period, the court analogized to the law of adverse possession of
land in California, and declared five years as a 'just and proper
measure of time" for the forfeiture of a water right. n 0 On that basis,
the court in Smith confirmed forfeiture of a right originating in 1862,
but which had not been used for more than five years.
5. Oregon, Idaho, New Mexico, and South Dakota
Some jurisdictions have applied statutory forfeiture provisions to
pre-code water rights without any explicit discussion of the issue. For
instance, in Crandallv. Water Resources Department, the Oregon Supreme
Court affirmed a decision of the Water Resources Department to
cancel an 1872 water right for five years of non-use.112 The Oregon
101. Id. at 645-46.
102. Id. at 646-47.
103. Id. at 647.
104. Id.
105. Tex. Water Rights Comm'n v. Wright, 464 S.W.2d 642, 649 (Tex. 1971).
106. Id. at 650.
107. Id. at 651.
108. Beck, supra note 36.
109. Smith v. Hawkins, 42 P. 453, 453 (Cal. 1895). California originally enacted the
statute in 1872.
110. Id. at 454.
111. Id. at 453. Current California law also contains an explicit five-year forfeiture
period. ARTHUR L. LITrLwoRTH & EicL. GARNER, CALIFORNIA WATER 47 (1995).

112. Crandall v. Water Res. Dep't, 626 P.2d 877 (Or. 1981).
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Legislature adopted their water code in 1909. In Rencken v. Young, the
state's highest court upheld the Department's application of the
statutory forfeiture period to an 1888 water right. 3 Neither case
contained any discussion of the propriety of applying statutory
forfeiture to pre-code rights.
Similar treatment, potentially allowing forfeiture of pre-code rights
New
without discussion of any challenge, is found in Idaho,'
6
1
5
Mexico, and South Dakota" judicial opinions. Applying statutory
forfeiture periods to rights that had vested before the state adopted
the applicable water code thus represents the majority approach.
Arizona, though unsuccessful, and Nevada are the lone proponents of
special treatment for pre-code rights. The next section compares and
critiques the various states' treatment of this issue.
C. NEVADA VS. THE REST OF THE WEST: COMPARISON AND CRITIQUE

The Nevada approach, embodied in the Manse Spring and Alpine
decisions, suffers from three flaws. First, exempting pre-code water
rights from statutory forfeiture provisions creates a special class of
"oldies, but really goodies." Essentially, some water rights, due only to
their vintage, do not have to play by the same rules as those with
somewhat later priority dates. Such special status is inconsistent with
the goals of certainty, uniformity, and equity embodied in the western
water codes. Second, treating pre-code water rights differently in this
way not only distinguishes them inappropriately from other water
rights, but also elevates them to a higher level of property protection
than they require or deserve. Water rights are usufructuary by their
Finally,
very nature rather than hard-edged property rights.
exempting the oldest rights from forfeiture deprives state water
resource managers of a necessary tool for making allocation decisions
and clearing up water use records as competition for water increases.
1. Old Rights as Special Rights
Treating pre-code water rights as special by exempting them from
statutory forfeiture is contrary to the western states' original purpose
The overarching purpose of
in adopting their water codes.
codification was to obtain certainty in water use and water rights. All
of the various statutory provisions, including state assertion of control
over water resources, permit requirements, beneficial use
requirements, forfeiture provisions, and adjudication procedures,
related to clarifying the terms under which the states would allow
113. Rencken v. Young, 711 P.2d 954 (Or. 1985). The court, however, remanded
the decision to the agency for reconsideration in light of possible error in assigning
the burden of proof. Id. at 961.
114. See Sears v. Berryman, 623 P.2d 455 (Idaho 1981); Crow v. Carlson, 690 P.2d
916 (Idaho 1984).
115. See State v. Davis, 319 P.2d 207, 210-11 (N.M. 1957).
116. See In re Cancellation of the Stabio Ditch Water Right on Spearfish Creek, 417
N.W.2d 391 (S.D. 1987) (upholding the cancellation of an 1877, pre-code water right).
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private parties to use a scarce and admittedly public resource. In
order to provide as much certainty as possible to water users in an arid
land, the states felt the need to bring some order to the chaotic system
of water rights created
by pre-statutory appropriations guided only by
17
custom and self-help.'
The Nevada Supreme Court, in the 1940 Manse Spring case,
focused on a water user's need for stability and certainty. However,
the court viewed certainty too narrowly by using only the perspective of
an individual pre-code water rights holder and ignoring the need for
certainty in the entire system of water rights. The Manse Spring court
noted the individual long-term water user's desire for stability, but
then mistakenly elevated and expanded that desire into a long-term
legal right. Instead of asking how much stability and security an
individual water rights holder was entitled to as a minimum under the
prevailing beneficial use requirements, the court decided that the user
was entitled to insist on no change whatsoever. This degree of
guaranteed stability is certainly inflated.
Furthermore, the need for stability and certainty is a collective
need, notjust an individual need. Junior water users, either upstream
or downstream, need stability and certainty in understanding their
water use limitations. A well-defined senior water right, therefore, can
aid everyone in the chain of use. Instead, Nevada's approach allows
water users with early priority dates to sit on their water rights and not
use the water for long periods. However, these users still hold legal
rights as long as they do not subjectively "intend" to relinquish the
rights. Meanwhile, junior users appropriate this unused, but not
abandoned, water at their own peril. There is no stability or certainty
for the juniors in counting on the continuing availability of that water.
Furthermore, the state lacks certainty in determining how much water
is truly subject to valid claims of right, and how much is available for
further appropriation. Thus, the Nevada approach provides a great
deal of stability (and flexibility) for those water rights that pre-date
1913, while injecting uncertainty into the system as a whole. The
Manse Spring court's decision seems to say that the stability of a very old
water right, as perceived by the right holder alone, is more important
than the continued efficient beneficial use of the state's water
resources.
The code drafters did not likely intend this result.
Legislatures enacted the codes to provide stability and certainty, not
just for any particular right holder, but for all users and the general
public as well.
What the early western legislatures more likely had in mind when
they adopted the initial water codes was preservation and protection of
the pre-code rights, but not a special status giving those rights greater
flexibility in use and non-use than all later acquired rights. The
"savings clauses" universally included in the water codes certainly
embody the intention of recognizing rights vested under pre-statutory

117.

See supra notes 40 & 41 and accompanying text.
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customs and methods. However, nothing in the history of these
codification efforts suggests that the legislature intended something
more to protect these early-acquired rights from uniform and
equitable application of the states' police power as embodied in later
legislation. There is no legitimate policy reason for creating two
classes of water rights in this fashion. Old rights are already "better"
and more valuable just because they are old. That is the whole point
of the prior appropriation doctrine: "first in time is first in right."
Priority is enough without adding an additional layer of superiority as
well.
The discussion of abandonment by the Manse Spring court might
suggest that the purpose of the common law abandonment doctrine
was primarily to protect the water user's right. After all, the court's
discussion emphasizes the user's perspective of the right's stability and
security and the user's intent to keep the water despite non-use for a
However, this represents a
period of more than five years.
misunderstanding of the purpose of the abandonment doctrine.
Abandonment, in fact, favors the public interest. When beneficial use
of water does not occur, the water rights revert to the state for
reallocation, or to the next junior user who might have a valid claim to
the water. This has been the settled law of every western state, both
before and after the enactment of the water codes." 8
Before the codification of the western water laws, however, there
was also no codification of how this loss by non-use occurred. The
courts had to develop the concept of divestiture of rights, just as they
developed the general concept of beneficial use and waste." 9 The
result was the doctrine of common law abandonment. The courts
certainly could not legislate a uniform time period for non-use that
would result in loss of the right, so the abandonment doctrine was
crafted as a substitute. 2 ' Proof of non-use for some significant period
of time created a presumption of abandonment, which could be
rebutted by a showing that the water user did not intend to
permanently relinquish the water. Without the ability to choose an
objective cutoff for loss by non-use, the courts were forced to fall back
on a subjective measure. Nonetheless, the point was to serve the
public interest by providing some enforcement device, however
imperfect, for the "use it or lose it" requirement. Allowing certain
users to sit on their water rights and escape the beneficial use
requirement was not the courts' purpose."'
118. See generally Neuman, supra note 3.
119. Id. at 929-33.
120. But see supra text accompanying notes 109-111 discussing Smith, where the
California Supreme Court legislated a uniform time period for non-use and read in a
five-year forfeiture period when the legislature had not specified a time period. It
seems that many courts would not be so willing to add to a statute in such a manner.

See 2

SAMUEL C. WIEL, WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN STATES

§ 575 (3 ed. 1911)

(claiming that the Smith v. Hawkins, 42 P. 453 (Cal. 1895) decision is "open to the
charge ofjudicial legislation").
121. As noted by the Texas Supreme Court, a water user acquires a right to use
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Indeed, the difficulty in proving the subjective intent element of
abandonment led to the adoption of forfeiture periods as a more
Thus,
effective means of enforcing loss of rights by non-use.
legislatures considered the clear, uniform, statutory forfeiture periods
to be an improvement on the doctrine of abandonment. The two
doctrines were not in opposition to each other, as the Manse Spring
court seemed to believe, but were just different means of reaching the
same end of maximum beneficial use of scarce water resources.
In fact, whether abandonment gives as much security to the precode water right holders as the Manse Spring opinion suggests is
questionable. Although the doctrine allowed proof of subjective intent
not to relinquish a water right, it does not follow that whenever a water
user said "I didn't mean to give it up," the inquiry automatically ended.
The possibility existed to overcome such a statement with objective
proof that, no matter what the water user said in court, his or her
conduct manifested a contrary intent. Thus, the doctrine never really
provided much certainty to a water user. Water users had uncertainty
over what a court would hold or ajury might find was sufficient proof
So, even for pre-code water rights holders, the bright line
of intent.
of a forfeiture statute provides better guidance and additional
certainty.
It is possible that the court in Manse Sping was really bothered by
the fact that the forfeiture provision was being applied strictly without
allowing a defense concerning the circumstances of that particular
case, rather than that it was being applied to a pre-code right. The
non-use of water in question in that case occurred after the death of23
the landowner, while a caretaker for the estate lived on the property.1
The court may have felt that the estate should be excused for its failure
to operate the ranch for a seven-year period of time. The court noted
that other jurisdictions provided leniency and protected a water 2right
"where circumstances were such as to prevent the beneficial use." 4
Rather than crafting a narrower holding to accommodate its
apparently real concern, the court threw the baby out with the bath
water, and held that forfeiture should never apply to pre-code rights.
Many states provide for hardship or other defenses to forfeiture in
statute, but some courts have done so by judicial decision as well.1 25
The Manse Spring court could have done the same. In refusing to
enforce the statutory forfeiture provision and injecting leniency
instead, the Manse Spring court displayed an antipathy and aversion to
forfeiture that is common among courts and other legal
water, not a right of non-use of water. See Texas Water Rights Comm'n v. Wright, 464
S.W.2d 642, 647 (Tex. 1971).
122. See Goplerud, supra note 3, § 17.03; 2 WIEL, supra note 120, §§ 567-570.
123. In reManse Spring, 108 P.2d 311, 314 (Nev. 1940).
124. Id. at 316 (referring to case law and statutory construction of a similar statute in
Wyoming).
125. See, e.g., TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.177(b) (1999) (discussing justified nonuse); Scott v. McTiernan, 974 P.2d 966, 970 (Wyo. 1999) (listing judicially created
defenses for non-use).
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commentators. 126 In any event, later courts, such as the Alpine court,
unfortunately have not seen fit to try to limit Manse Spring to its facts,
or overrule it on this basis.
Curiously, in a 1914 case, the Nevada Supreme Court had already
rejected the notion that the savings clause in the water code totally

exempted pre-code water rights from regulation. 27 The court said that
the savings clause
must be construed in connection with other provisions of the act.
The whole scope and purpose of the act show that it was intended to
apply to all water rights, whether acquired before or after its
adoption. There would be little or no use in attempting state control
over a stream or stream system unless all water rights were brought
under that control.... Nothing in the act shall be deemed to impair
these vested rights; that is, they shall not be diminished in quantity or
value. As they are all prior in time to water rights secured in
accordance 28with later statutory provisions, such priorities must be
recognized.

The Ormsby court had it right, but for some reason, the Manse
Spring court got it wrong. Apparently, the Manse Spring court thought
that subjecting pre-code rights to the statutory forfeiture provision
diminished their value. 2 However, the court misconstrued the nature
126. See Rose, supra note 46, at 597-601 (discussing the common "abhorrence" to
forfeiture, which often results in replacing a "crystalline" rule with a "muddy" rule
when the enforcement of the crystal rule would create a dramatic loss for one party).
In fact, the Manse Spring court referred to forfeiture as a "punishment." 108 P.2d at
315 (citation omitted). This seems like a bit of an overstatement regarding forfeiture,
which, in the water rights context, is simply the consequence for knowing non-use. See
supra note 7 and accompanying text.
127. Ormsby County v. Kearney, 142 P. 803 (Nev. 1914).
128. Id. at 810. Although the Ormsby court considered the code's adjudication
process, the court's comments are equally compelling in the context of the forfeiture
provisions.
129. Interestingly, the Nevada Supreme Court distinguished Manse Spring in a case
involving a groundwater right. In Town of Eureka v. Office of the State Eng'r, 826 P.2d 948
(Nev. 1992), the court applied the five-year statutory forfeiture provision retroactively
to effect a partial forfeiture of groundwater rights. The Town of Eureka had
purchased the water rights and had filed a change of use application with the Nevada
State Engineer. Other parties protested that Eureka had forfeited their rights by five
years of non-use. Eureka made the same argument as in the Manse Spring case: the
application of the forfeiture statute to its water rights would be unconstitutional
because at the time its water rights vested, the only way a party could lose water rights
was by abandonment. Id. at 950. The Nevada Supreme Court found that the
groundwater code did not contain the same "savings" provision as the 1913 surface
water code at issue in Manse Spring. Id. at 951. Instead, the groundwater code
contained an affirmative statement that the forfeiture provision would apply to all
groundwater rights, including those in existence at the time of the code's enactment.
Id. at 950. The court seems to hold the statement of the legislature, in and of itself,
makes the statute's retroactivity constitutional.
In some ways, the court made a similar mistake in Eureka as it did in Manse
Spring. In Manse Spring, the court took the savings clause at face value. Without
carefully analyzing just what the right was, and whether the statutory change truly
impaired the right, the court held that a change in an existing right was not allowed.
In Eureka, the court took the groundwater statute's retroactivity provision at face value,
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of common law abandonment as a doctrine "allowing" substantial
periods of non-use as long as the water user had a subjective "empty
head, pure heart" intent to keep the water right. Instead, the
abandonment doctrine simply represented the best the courts came
up with to try to enforce the "use it or lose it" requirement. Pre-code
water rights holders are not excused from the beneficial use
requirement, and have no claim to a more flexible right than later
users. Therefore, applying the statutory forfeiture provision would not
impair those early rights.
D. THE USUFRUCTUARY NATURE OF WATER RIGHTS

Another reason there is no justification for special treatment of
pre-code water rights is the inherent usufructuary nature of water
rights. Long before codification of western water laws, and from the
earliest days of the development of the prior appropriation doctrine as
a mining camp custom, the concept of ongoing beneficial use limited
water rights. "Use it or lose it" has been one of the most basic
principles of prior appropriation from the very beginning.3 0 As the
Texas Supreme Court put it, the right is to use water, and there is no
right to the non-use of water. 3 ' Of course, until the creation of state
water regulatory agencies and adoption of forfeiture statutes, the only
way to implement this concept was through the use of common law
abandonment enforced in courts of law. However, the need to
demonstrate continuous, ongoing, beneficial use has always been a
central component of the prior appropriation doctrine. Therefore,
western water users could hardly claim to be surprised that the early
water codes attempted to give some clarity to the well-known potential
for loss by non-use through enacting forfeiture time periods. The very
point of these statutes was to give some actual objective meaning to the
"use it or lose it" requirement.
Furthermore, a water user's right to the use of water has never
been a hard-edged property right, which entitled the user to an
absolute amount of specific molecules of water. Rather, the right is a
much more malleable usufructuary right.'32 Black's Law Dictionary
defines "usufructuary" as: "[a] person who has the right to the benefits
of another's property." 3 State courts throughout the West have
affirmed the "use only" nature of the property interest in water
rights.' In 1900, the Wyoming Supreme Court described the interest
and simply said it agreed with the lower court that the statute is constitutional. Id. at
951. If the Manse court was right, how could the Eureka court also be right? If the
application of statutory forfeiture to rights acquired when only abandonment was
recognized is an unconstitutional impairment of those rights, such application should
be unconstitutional regardless of what the legislature purports to say about it.
130. See generally Neuman, supra note 3.
131. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
132. See Neuman, supra note 3, at 922. See generallyJoseph L. Sax, The Limits of Private
Rights in Public Waters, 19 ENVrL. L. 473 (1989).
133. BLAcK's LAw DIcTioNARY 1543 (7th ed. 1999).
134. See, e.g., Baeth v. Hoisveen, 157 N.W.2d 728, 732 (N.D. 1968) (water rights are
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as follows:
Although an appropriator secures a right which has been held with
good reason to amount to a property right, he does not acquire a title
to the running waters themselves... The title of the appropriator
fastens, not upon the water while flowing along its natural channel,
but to the use of a limited amount thereof for beneficial purposes in
pursuance of an appropriation lawfully made and continued, '5
The Wyoming court's statement emphasizes both that the property
interest is usufructuary rather than a fee interest, and that in order to
maintain the right, the use must be continuous. The concept of
ongoing beneficial use was entrenched in western water law before the

adoption of many of the western water codes.
In a 1989 article on the limited nature of the private property
interest of water rights holders, Professor Joe Sax made the following

statement:
The rights of use in water, however long standing, should never be
confused with more personal, more fully owned, property. Far from
being a sudden and unpredictable change in the definition of
property, recognition of the right of the state to protect its water
resources is only a restatement of a familiar and oft-stated public
prerogative."

Although Professor Sax was discussing potential state regulation in
relation to the public trust, his point is equally applicable to state
regulation of the manner of loss of water rights by non-use. Certainly,
the Manse court did not have the benefit of this statement, but it is as
accurate in its description of the Public/private interest in water
resources fifty years ago as it is today.
It is important to stress that the limitations on the nature of the
private usufruct existed from the beginning, and later state regulation
of the terms of the right's exercise was to be expected. As Professor
Sax puts it: "Because rights granted in water have always been subject
to what Justice Holmes called an initial limitation of private rights, the
subsequent exercise of public authority as a limitation on such
rights.., is neither a redefinition nor a repudiation of property
rights."' In particular, state regulation that simply puts a time limit

usufructuary, not absolute); Knapp v. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist., 279 P.2d
420, 425 (Colo. 1955) (appropriative water rights are possessory, not freehold).
135. Farm Inv. Co. v. Carpenter, 61 P. 258, 265 (Wyo. 1900) (emphasis added).
136. Sax, supra note 132, at 482.
137. Indeed, Professor Sax's article discusses three early 20th century Supreme
Court opinions by Oliver Wendell Holmes concerning the intersection of public and
private rights in water and other natural resources. Sax notes that Holmes "took
property rights very seriously," and thus his statements about the subordination of
private rights in water to certain public rights "stands as a fundamental building block
of property jurisprudence." Sax, supra note 132, at 480.
138. Id. at 481-82.
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on how long a water right may remain unused before being lost, rather
than allowing the water user to control loss subjectively with intent, is
regulation that is completely consistent with the ongoing requirement
of beneficial use as part of the maintenance of a water right. Thus, the
Nevada approach (and the Arizona attempt), in elevating the status of
pre-code water rights above those obtained under the code, arrogates
to the pre-code rights characteristics that are inconsistent with the
basic usufructuary nature of water rights.
Furthermore, not even the hallowed fee simple property interest in
a parcel of land is immune from subsequent exercise of the police
power by the state. This is true even if such regulation does, arguably,
"take[] away much of the stability and security of the right to the
continued use"'39 of such property. Zoning and land use regulations
are the classic examples. For years, the owners of a parcel of property
may have intended that property for a certain kind of development,
yet the opportunity for such development may have become
unavailable for such development due to subsequent land use
regulation. Although claims of "regulatory takings" are frequently
raised under these circumstances, few such claims are actually
successful in defeating the regulation. 4 ° It is absolutely elementary
that the state can legitimately and constitutionally regulate real
property in ways that arguably change the "stability and security" of the
property's use when viewed from the individual landowner's
perspective at an earlier point in time. If this is so for land regulation,
it is even more applicable to water rights regulation.
Perhaps the doctrine of adverse possession is an even better
analogy than zoning regulations. In both forfeiture and adverse
possession, owners may lose property rights, notjust by later operation
of law, but as a consequence of their own voluntary conduct in failing
to use and protect their own property. Such a consequence hardly
seems harsh or unreasonable, and is completely consistent with the
usufructuary nature of water rights.
E. FORFEITURE AS A WATER MANAGEMENT TOOL

Exempting the oldest water rights from forfeiture deprives state
water resource managers of a tool they will need as competition for
scarce water increases. In recent decades, water managers in the
western states have recognized a need to "tune the system," to tighten
up former laissez faire management practices in order to get the most
out of limited water resources.

139. In reManse Spring, 108 P.2d 311, 316 (Nev. 1940).
140. See generally William Funk, Evolution or Restatement? Awaiting Answers to Lucas'
Unanswered Questions, 23 ENvTL. L. 891 (1993); William Funk, Reading Dolan v. City of
Tigard, 25 ENVTL. L. 127 (1995).
141.
See BRUCE DRIVER, WESTERN WATER: TUNING THE SYSTEM: THE REPORT TO THE
WESTERN GOVERNORS' ASSOCIATION FROM THE WATER EFFICIENCY TASK FORCE 24, 47, 59,

61 (1986) (discussing how states need to clarify water rights and tune the system so
that it is sufficiently flexible to permit water to flow to its highest value and allow needs
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The 1998 Report of the Western Water Policy Review Advisory
Commission identified the number one "core challenge" facing
western water managers as "[t]he sustainable use of existing supplies:
balancing consumptive and nonconsumptive uses of existing water
resources, including the problem of overallocation of supplies,
groundwater overdraft, the augmentation of supplies, and using
supplies more efficiently." 14 2 The Report stressed that in order to
achieve sustainable use of existing water, the states will need to "define
the baseline flows necessary for operative ecosystems" and then pursue
innovative "[c]ombinations of physical solutions, conservation, and
voluntary transfers" to obtain a sustainable balance between
uses.141
consumptive and nonconsumptive
In order to define baseline flows and determine if these flows are
satisfied or if the streams are instead overappropriated, a state will
need a full and accurate picture of both paper legal rights and actual
water use. This includes reliable data about whether rights have been
lost by non-use, and the ability to obtain administrative or judicial
declarations to that effect.1 44 Depriving water managers of statutory
forfeiture for the oldest water rights and relegating them to the less
predictable, less uniform, and ultimately more expensive process of
and unnecessary
proving intentional abandonment erects inefficient
1 45
hurdles in the path of rational water management.
Further, for conservation and voluntary transfers to be attractive,
Precise, or "crystalline,"
water rights must be clearly defined.
transfers, because both
market
definitions of property rights facilitate
dealing with and can
are
they
the buyer and seller know exactly what
14
hand, open-ended
other
the
value the transaction accordingly. 1 On
to be met at the least cost; states can use forfeiture and abandonment authority to
compel efficient water use).
142.

WATER IN THE WEST,

supra note 25, at 3-4.

143. Id. at 3-6.
144. See DRIVER, supra note 141, at 24 (arguing that states must "ratify" property
rights in water and to do so they will need much more data and knowledge about
existing water rights, return flows, etc.). Driver makes the point that aggressively
pursuing declarations of waste, forfeiture, and abandonment may in fact discourage
market transfers because it takes away the incentive for a water user to conserve and
then transfer surplus or saved water to others. Id. at 58. However, he notes that a state
could combine a regulatory and market facilitation approach by allowing a "grace
period" of transfers and then following up with an aggressive regulatory approach. Id.
at 61. Either way, clarity in the amount of water that water users are entitled to use is a
basic need.
145. See 1 SAMUEL C. WIEL, WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN STATES §§ 567-570
(providing that abandonment is always a question of fact, with the burden of proof on
the party arguing abandonment; non-use is not conclusive, but is merely evidence of
intent to abandon, along with statements of the water user both in and out of court,
and all the facts and circumstances of each particular case. Forfeiture is much easier
to establish, simply by showing non-use for the statutory period; the burden is then on
the water user (who is more likely to have access to such proof) to show a defense).
146. See Rose, supra note 46, at 590 (discussing the preference of legal academics for
precise specifications of entitlements over open-ended entitlements as a way of
facilitating markets). See also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WATER TRANSFERS: MORE
EFFICIENT WATER USE POSSIBLE, IF PROBLEMS ARE ADDRESSED 47 (1994) ("[E]ffective
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or muddy entitlements make market transactions more difficult.'47 An
old, but unused, water right that may or may not still be valid,
depending on the outcome of a fact-specific and subjective
abandonment case, is certainly a very muddy entitlement indeed.
Such unclear rights do not provide either senior or junior users (or
others who might want to deal with them) the requisite certainty
needed to pursue efficiency improvements or market transactions.
Thus, for states to exercise comprehensive management and
control over their water supplies, it is critical for the states to have
complete and accurate data about water availability, existing legal
rights, and actual water use. Allowing senior water users to hold but
not exercise extensive inchoate water rights interferes with and
frustrates state water managers' attempts at comprehensive water
management.
V. CONCLUSION
Old is good for western water rights. A water right with a senior
priority date on an overappropriated stream in an arid western state is
a valuable property right, and the owners of such rights are in an
enviable position. But just how good should these rights be? Senior
rights, whether or not they predate a state's water code, should only be
as good as their priority date and no better. Pre-code rights have
always been subject to the same "use it or lose it" requirement of the
prior appropriation doctrine, and thus they should be subject to the
statutory forfeiture requirements just like later acquired rights. Giving
old rights special status by exempting them from statutory forfeiture,
as Nevada has done and Arizona tried to do, flies in the face of the
purposes behind codification of the prior appropriation doctrine, is
contrary to the usufructuary nature of water rights, and deprives state
water managers of a necessary management tool. States faced with an
exemption claim by pre-code water rights holders would be wise to
follow the lead of the majority of the western states who have
addressed this issue and apply forfeiture statutes uniformly, rather
than muddying the waters and unnecessarily inflating the value of the
most senior water rights by giving their owners a special right not to use
their water.

markets require clear, secure property rights").
147. See Rose, supra note 46, at 590.

